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Abstract
We analyze the pricing and informational eﬃciency of the Italian market for options written
on the most important stock index, the MIB30. We report that a striking percentage of the data
consists of option prices violating basic no-arbitrage conditions. This percentage declines when
we relax the no-arbitrage restrictions to accommodate for the presence of bid/ask spreads and
other frictions, but never becomes negligible. We also investigate the informational eﬃciency of
the MIBO and conclude that option prices are poor predictors of the volatility of MIB30 returns.
This conclusion is robust to a number of statistical and sampling methods.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate the eﬃciency properties of the market for options on the Italian MIB30
index, the MIBO market, one of the most important segments of the Italian Derivatives Market
(IDEM). Following the creation of the index futures market (FIB30) by approximately one year,
trading on the MIBO started in November 1995. The birth of the MIBO has been a crucial step
towards the completion of the Italian stock market. MIB30 index options have soon become an
important financial instrument, especially for institutional investors (like mutual funds) whose port-
folios have typically a large share allocated to securities with a high degree of correlation with the
MIB30 index.1
The importance of the Italian MIBO market parallels the prominent role of index options markets
in modern financial systems. In the first place, these markets are essential for risk sharing. On the one
hand, options enable portfolio managers to improve their ability to hedge the risk of unpredictable
changes of financial prices. On the other hand, investors may easily take speculative positions
consistent with their views on future asset price movements. In the absence of well functioning
option markets both these activities – hedging and speculation – would be too costly or simply
unfeasible. Second, index options markets represent the best available instrument for aggregating
investors’ opinions concerning the future volatility of asset returns. Therefore, an eﬃcient options
market should: (i) foster the implementation of hedging and speculative activities at aﬀordable
costs (risk-sharing and pricing eﬃciency), and (ii) accurately aggregate market beliefs concerning
asset returns volatility (informational eﬃciency). The main objective of our paper is to assess these
two distinct but correlated notions of eﬃciency of the Italian MIBO market using a high frequency
data set spanning from April 1999 to January 2000. Our investigation gives us an opportunity to
contribute to two distinct literatures.
First, the analysis of the risk-sharing eﬃciency of a financial market always raises issues on the
existence of arbitrage opportunities, the sharpest antithesis to risk sharing. The assessment of the
presence of arbitrage opportunities has a long tradition in empirical finance.2 In fact for frictionless
markets it is possible to derive constraints on options prices that, if not respected, represent arbitrage
opportunities that may be exploited by explicit portfolio strategies. This approach has the advan-
tage of being free of any theoretical assumption (save individual rationality), and provides sensible
predictions based solely on first principles. The best example is the test of the put/call parity, which
has been repeatedly performed over the years for diﬀerent markets and samples (see Stoll (1969) for
pioneer work). We will test for the presence of arbitrage opportunities in Section 3. We improve on
the previous literature by proposing a wider and more complete set of no arbitrage restrictions. In
1During 1999 (the year to which our analysis refers) the volume of trades on stocks belonging to the MIB30 basket
(measured in domestic currency) accounted for approximately 76.4% of the total trading volume on the Italian stock
exchange.
2Seminal papers are Stoll (1969), Gould and Galai (1974), and Klemkosky and Resnik (1979). More recently this
issue has been addressed by Ackert and Tian (1999, 2000), George and Longstaﬀ (1993), Kamara and Miller (1995),
Nisbet (1992), Ronn and Ronn (1989), and Yadav and Pope (1994). However most of these papers focus on North
American markets, especially on S&P 100 and S&P 500 options.
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particular, we develop and test a new condition, the maturity spread, that is particularly useful in
establishing a link between the level of eﬃciency of options and futures markets. Also, we carefully
distinguish between tests that jointly rely on the eﬃciency of the markets for options and the un-
derlying from tests exclusively measuring MIBO eﬃciency (see Ackert and Tian (2000)). While in
some papers (see Nisbet (1992)) it has been shown that most arbitrage opportunities vanish after
the introduction of frictions,3 in Section 4 we take the view that the amount of market imperfections
should itself be considered an indicator of market eﬃciency. Therefore, diﬀerently from previous
contributions, we avoid conducting a simple test of market eﬃciency given transaction costs but
rather treat frictions as a parameter that we let assume diﬀerent values. We interpret eﬃciency as a
concept with two dimensions, arbitrage opportunities and the size of transaction costs, and we then
represent our findings via a curve that describes how arbitrage opportunities vanish when transac-
tion costs are increased. Given the novelty of the concept of eﬃciency we adopt, the comparison
with other papers can only be indirect: this is our stronger motivation for conducting one further
study on the eﬃciency of financial markets.
Second, starting from Canina and Figlewski (1993), several authors have measured the informa-
tional eﬃciency of options markets by testing the unbiasedness of implied volatility as a predictor of
ex post, realized volatility of stock returns. The common finding has been that implied volatilities
are poor forecasts of future volatility and that a prediction based on option prices can easily be im-
proved upon by using variables commonly included in the agents’ information sets. These conclusions
have been recently challenged by a few papers, e.g. Christensen and Prabhala (1998). In Section 5
we supplement traditional methods of investigation (such as GMM) with a number of econometric
approaches, including novel, panel-oriented tools. Furthermore, we explore the relationship between
pricing and informational eﬃciency: although the two concepts are independent one from another,
one is allowed to expect evidence of correlation. We do this by probing the robustness of our results
to the use of data sets exposed in diﬀerent degrees to the presence of arbitrage opportunities
Our results for the Italian options market are that the no arbitrage restrictions are not satisfied
for a high percentage of the data and this suggests that market frictions must be incorporated when
testing arbitrage relationships. We then compute the level of frictions which would be consistent
with a reasonably low ratio of arbitrage opportunities and find that implied frictions are quite
substantial. The conclusion so obtained is further strengthened by investigating the informational
eﬃciency of the market. Consistently with results concerning other markets, we report that MIBO
implied volatilities are poor predictors of future volatility.
A limited number of papers have already examined the Italian index options market (see Barone
and Cuoco (1989)). In particular, in a recent paper Cavallo and Mammola (2000) investigate the
eﬃciency properties of the MIBO market. Similarly to us, they use high-frequency observations.4
However they only test the put-call parity relation and apply their tests to at-the-money, short-
3Cavallo and Mammola is an example directly pertaining to the MIBO30. However other Authors (see Ackert and
Tian (2000)) establish that arbitrage violations persist despite frictions, although to a lesser extent.
4Their data set is shorter and refers to an earlier period (July 29, 1996 — February, 1997). Market rules also slightly
diﬀer. In particular, bounds on bid/ask spreads have been changed.
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term contracts only, while we extend our investigations to all categories of contracts. Cavallo and
Mammola partly use available data on the bid-ask spread, and partly guess the relevant transaction
costs, while (as stressed above) we treat frictions parametrically and consider them as a crucial
component of the notion of market eﬃciency.
We have special motivation for focusing on the MIBO market. First, such a relatively young
market oﬀers a unique opportunity to apply the approach to eﬃciency outlined above. A number of
papers (e.g. Mittnik and Rieken (2000), Pen˜a et al. (1999), and Puttonen (1993)) have been recently
devoted to the investigation of other relatively new derivatives markets. Second, given our conclusion
on the quality of the prices depending on frictions, it is interesting to link the classical literature on
arbitrage in options markets with tests of the informational content of prices concerning the future
volatility of the underlying. For the MIBO market, we find that rejecting informational eﬃciency
cannot be purely imputed to mispricings, as our results are robust to the exclusion of records aﬀected
by arbitrage. This outcome suggests the conjecture that informational ineﬃciency might lie at a
deeper level than the presence of arbitrage opportunities and that it may be more diﬃcult to explain
than invoking frictions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data set and some of the
institutional characteristics of the MIBO market. In Section 3 we report the results of no-arbitrage
tests, showing in detail which conditions are more often violated, in which segment of the market this
happens more frequently, and the level of the average profits associated to each type of violation.
In addition to the usual no arbitrage conditions, we introduce the maturity spread and discuss
its features. Given our finding of pervasive violations of the most basic no-arbitrage restrictions, in
Section 4 we proceed to imply out of the data the level of frictions compatible with pricing eﬃciency.
Section 5 documents the intrinsic informational ineﬃciency of the MIBO market. Section 6 concludes
with policy issues and directions for future research.
2. The Data
We analyze a high-frequency data set of European options written on the MIB30 Italian stock index.5
The MIB30 index is a capital-weighted average of the price of 30 Italian blue chips, which represent
approximately 80% of the whole Italian stock market. Our sample contains data collected at a
frequency of 30 minutes from 9 a.m. to 5:25 p.m. each day starting on April 6, 1999 and ending
on January 31, 2000, for a total of 300 calendar days and approximately 15 observations per day.
Each observation reports the value of the MIB30 index, the risk-free interest rate, the cross-section
of MIBO30 option prices (over multiple strikes and maturities) and the bid and ask volumes.6 The
interest rate is computed as an average of the bid and ask three-month LIBOR rates. Although far
5The MIBO, established in November 1995, is a fully automated quote-driven market. Market makers have the
obligation to quote prices for a specified set of contracts, expressly indicated in the market rules. Contracts are settled
in cash. During 1999 the volume of exchanges (in milions of Euros) has been equal to 399, 031 and the number of
traded contracts 2, 236, 241.
6Because of standing IDEM rules, bid/ask quotes are not released and therefore unavailable; only bid/ask volumes
are released to the public.
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being from constant over the whole period, the risk-free rate shows only two major breaks in its
mean, May 5, 1999 and September 29, 1999 when the mean switches respectively from about 2.95%
to 2.69% and then from 2.69% to approximately 3.37%. Table I reports basic summary statistics for
the data under investigation.
The vector of option prices reports the transaction price for contracts with diﬀerent strike prices
and maturities. According to IDEM market rules for the period under analysis, prices were quoted
for the options with strike price nearest to the index, two strikes above and two below it. Strike
prices diﬀer from one another by 500 “index points”, each of the value of 2.5 euros. Furthermore,
prices were also quoted for options with the three shortest monthly maturities and the three shortest
quarterly maturities. In principle this would return a vector of approximately 25 prices for call and
put contracts at each point in time, i.e. about 750 prices a day. Nevertheless contracts with long
maturities or with strike price far from the value of the index were not actively traded (if traded at
all) and discarding them from the sample leaves us with a total 75, 900 prices, of which 37, 920 refer
to calls and 37, 980 to puts.7
Let St be the value of the MIB30 index at time t, K the strike price of a given option contract,
and τ the number of days to the expiration of the contract. A major characteristic of an option is
moneyness zt, i.e. either St/K (for a call) or K/St (for a put). By distinguishing contracts on the
basis of moneyness and the length of their residual life we can obtain a detailed description of the
composition of our sample (see Table II). We have adopted the following definitions: an option is
considered at the money (ATM) if the strike price is within 2% from the index; if it is within 5% (but
apart by 2% or more) the option is in the money (ITM) or out of the money (OTM) respectively,
depending on the sign (either positive or negative, respectively) of its intrinsic value St − K; an
option is deep in-the-money (DITM) or deep out-of-the-money (DOTM) if its strike price diﬀers
from the value of the underlying by more than 5%. We also define the following maturity classes: a
contract has very short time to expiration if τ ∈ (0, 7], short if τ ∈ (7, 25], medium if τ ∈ (25, 50],
long if τ ∈ (50, 90] , and very long when τ ∈ (90,∞). It is evident from Table II that more than
half of the data set is composed of options which expire within a month, while almost no contract
with residual life exceeding three months caused significant trading. This justifies merging options
with maturity over 50 days and choosing a three month reference for the risk-free interest rate. The
most important class in the sample is ATM options with short residual life (16%). More generally,
ATM options represent more than one third of the data set, while short- and medium-term contracts
account for almost 80%.8
Finally, although option prices in our sample refer to actually traded contracts (and the high
frequency of the data set should bound the time lag among quotes), one should worry about the
presence in the sample of index quotes possibly reporting stale prices thus making the value of the
underlying non synchronous with the option. To prevent our tests from being strongly influenced
by any issue of synchronicity, in what follows we focus exclusively on a class of arbitrage tests for
7This makes the dimension of our data set quite considerable with respect to other works in this field. For instance,
Cavallo and Mammola (2000) eﬀectively use only 3, 642 observations.
8These figures stress the arbitrariness of restricting the analysis to either ATM or short-term contracts only.
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which synchronous reporting of option and index prices is not crucial and consider further types of
arbitrage relations only for completeness.
3. Arbitrage Tests
For frictionless options markets absence of arbitrage is equivalent to the pricing rules
ct (K, τ) = EQ,t
£
e−rτ max (ST −K, 0)
¤
(1a)
pt (K, τ) = EQ,t
£
e−rτ max (K − ST , 0)
¤
, (1b)
where ct and pt indicate the time t price of a call and a put with strike K and time to maturity
τ ≡ T − t. Q is the risk neutral probability measure. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume
throughout that the interest rate r is constant.9 It is then possible to derive from (1) some explicit
relationships that need to hold if arbitrage is absent. Some of these conditions have been extensively
studied and are described in many finance textbooks. These are: (i) the lower bound; (ii) the
monotonic relationship with respect to the strike price; (iii) the “Butterfly” spread condition, and
(iv) the put/call parity i.e. pt (K) − ct (K) + St = Ke−rτ . We will not spend time commenting
the economic meaning of these conditions, for which the reader may refer to a number of well
known papers (see, among others, Klemkosky and Resnik (1979), Figlewski (1989), Nisbet (1992),
George and Longstaﬀ (1993), and Kamara and Miller (1995)). Neither shall we be too detailed in
illustrating the empirical results obtained with these tests which, although included in Table III for
general reference, are of a lesser importance. Let us only mention that the put/call parity has been
tested in the form of two separate inequalities, as customary, i.e.
pt (K)− ct (K) + St −Ke−rτ ≥ 0 (2a)
Ke−rτ − pt (K) + ct (K)− St ≥ 0. (2b)
Notably, the outcome of a test based on the lower bound and the put/call parity depends on
the degree of eﬃciency in the underlying market as well as in the derivatives market. For this
reason these are truly joint conditions and it is hard to disentangle the contributions of the two
markets to possible violations. Furthermore, these tests require a synchronous recording of option
prices and the underlying which is often questionable in practice. The actual implementation of the
corresponding trading strategies is also rather delicate, because in order to exploit violations either
of the lower bound for a call contract or of condition (2b) the investor is required to take a short
position in the underlying and this is likely to be complex and costly (if possible at all). In order
to partially overcome these problems and gain more details on the actual eﬃciency of the MIBO
market in isolation, we also consider the following conditions:
Maturity Monotonicity (τ2 > τ1):
ct (τ2)− ct (τ1) ≥ 0 (3a)
pt (τ2)− pt (τ1)−K
£
e−rτ1 − e−rτ2
¤
≥ 0 (3b)
9Section 4 discusses the robustness of our results to this assumption.
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Reverse Strike Monotonicity (K1 > K2):
(K1 −K2) e−rτ − ct (K2) + ct (K1) ≥ 0 (4a)
pt (K1)− pt (K2)− (K1 −K2) e−rτ ≥ 0 (4b)
Box Spreads:
[pt (K1)− ct (K1)]− [pt (K2)− ct (K2)] = (K1 −K2) e−rτ
or equivalently 10
[pt (K1)− ct (K1)]− [pt (K2)− ct (K2)]− (K1 −K2) e−rτ ≥ 0 (5a)
(K1 −K2) e−rτ − [pt (K1)− ct (K1)] + [pt (K2)− ct (K2)] ≥ 0 (5b)
Maturity Spreads:
[pt (τ1)− ct (τ1)]− [pt (τ2)− ct (τ2)] = K
£
e−rτ1 − e−rτ2
¤
or equivalently
[pt (τ1)− ct (τ1)]− [pt (τ2)− ct (τ2)]−K
£
e−rτ1 − e−rτ2
¤
≥ 0 (6a)
[pt (τ2)− ct (τ2)]− [pt (τ1)− ct (τ1)] +K
£
e−rτ1 − e−rτ2
¤
≥ 0 (6b)
It is easy to see how these were obtained. (5) and (6) directly follow from the put/call parity evaluated
over a pair of diﬀerent strike prices and maturities, respectively, and taking the diﬀerence between
the values so obtained. (4) follows combining (5) with the monotone relationship with respect to the
strike price. The advantage of (4) — (6) over the put/call parity is that the corresponding portfolios
do not imply any position but in the options market. Moreover, the synchronicity issue is of minor
concern. (4) and (5) have been introduced by Ronn and Ronn (1989); (6) is, to our knowledge,
entirely new, and this justifies a more detailed analysis.
Let τ1 < τ2 and consider selling one put and buying one call both maturing in τ1 days and with
strike price K and refinancing the position upon maturity for τ2− τ1 additional days. The resulting
investment delivers at time t+ τ2 a payoﬀ equal to (St+τ1 −K) exp {r (τ2 − τ1)}. This first trading
strategy should then be confronted with the one obtained by selling one put and buying one call both
maturing in τ2 days and with strike price K while raising the amount K [exp (−rτ1)− exp (−rτ2)]
on the bond market (the Payoﬀs and costs of both strategies are reported in the following table.)
t · · · t+ τ1 · · · t+ τ2
ct (τ1)− pt (τ1) St+τ1 −K → (St+τ1 −K) er(τ2−τ1)
ct (τ2)− pt (τ2)−K (e−rτ1 − e−rτ2) St+τ2 −Ker(τ2−τ1)
This second portfolio of options has the same maturity of the previous one but a final payoﬀ equal
to St+τ2 −K exp {r (τ2 − τ1)}. Taking a short position in the former strategy and a long one in the
10Decomposing again an equation into two simultaneous inequalities.
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latter leaves the investor with a portfolio yielding St+τ2 −St+τ1 exp {r (τ2 − τ 1)} at time t+ τ2 and
initial cost
[ct (τ2)− pt (τ2)]− [ct (τ1)− pt (τ1)]−K
¡
e−rτ1 − e−rτ2
¢
(7)
Such an investment reflects the expectation that, in discounted terms, the underlying will increase
over the period t+τ1, t+τ2. In fact the same payoﬀ would be obtained buying at time t+τ1 a future
with maturity t + τ2, a strategy bearing no cost. It follows that whenever (7) is strictly positive —
i.e. 6b is violated — the relative price of long maturities with respect to short ones is too high, given
the investment opportunity oﬀered by the future market: an arbitrage opportunity therefore arises
by trading simultaneously on both markets. As a consequence, (6) is to be considered more as a test
on the joint eﬃciency of these two markets or, more precisely, on the degree of integration between
them: For this reason we preferred not to include it when computing the total number of arbitrage
opportunities on the MIBO market but treat it separately in our analyses.
The results of all these tests are reported in Tables III and VI, in the columns labelled α = 0: in
Table III we report for each condition the percentage of contracts allowing for arbitrage11, the average
level of arbitrage profits; Table VI describes the distribution of the number of violations across
moneyness and time to maturity. The overall number of arbitrage violations is indeed outstanding,
more than 50% of the sample. For what concerns the diﬀerent conditions tested, it clearly emerges
that the most often violated are Box spreads (5) and the put/call parity. The two Box conditions are
violated almost equally often, but the put-call parity condition is highly asymmetrical and it is the
short hedge (2b) the most relevant one. This finding reflects the higher diﬃculty and costs to take
a short position in the index as required to exploit this violation.12 Also the convexity condition
(Butterfly) is often not satisfied.13 The small number of violations of the monotonic relationships
with respect to strike price and maturity, provides some evidence that lack of synchronicity between
the MIB30 and option prices is not too serious in our data set.14 The distribution of the number of
violations across moneyness, time to maturity and type of condition violated is also interesting (Table
VI), for two diﬀerent reasons. First, it shows that arbitrage opportunities are not concentrated in the
more illiquid segments of the market but rather considerably spread across moneyness and maturity.
Second, the number of arbitrage opportunities detected increases the shorter the time to maturity
and the higher the moneyness. Short-term, ITM and DITM options are normally considered quite
illiquid: Those investors who own such options have good prospects of receiving a positive final
11When the condition tested implies more than one contract, we arbitrarily impute violations of such conditions to
only one contract.
12Cavallo and Mammola (2000) reach the same conclusion.
13This is due to the very general form in which we test it. In most studies the butterfly condition is tested by
confronting each contract with just a pair of contracts, those with strike price immediately larger and smaller. For
an option appearing in the nth position inside a vector of 25 option prices sorted by the strike price, there are in fact
(n− 1)× (25− n) possible hedges, n = 2, . . . , 24, for a total of 2, 300.
14In fact, whenever an option contract has not been actively traded it would easily be the case that the intervening
variation in the value of the index results in a vertical misalignment of option prices. Problems with the automatic
quoting system made such an event extremely frequent in the first months of 1999. For this reason these additional 3
months of data were not included in our study in spite of their availability.
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payoﬀ if they hold them to maturity rather than trade for arbitrage profits. We thus find some
correlation between mispricing and liquidity.
The maturity spread condition (6) is also frequently violated. The striking fact here is the
deep asymmetry between the short side (6a) – which is negligible – and the long side, which is
often violated. Another noteworthy feature which emerges from Table VI is that such arbitrage
opportunities are almost exclusively concentrated in the segment of contracts with residual life
within a month. As remarked above, (6b) indicates an excessive relative price of long maturities
with respect to shorter ones and reflects the expectation of long-term increases of the index, a
scenario consistent with the bull market of the last part of 1999. As previously argued, the arbitrage
strategy involved implies selling a basket of options of two diﬀerent maturities and buying a future
with maturity equal to the diﬀerence between the two. The mispricing detected has an interesting
interpretation in terms of market microstructure. IDEM rules result in an almost complete lack
of maturity overlap between the options and the futures markets. On the FIB30 are traded only
futures with quarterly maturities (March, June, September, and December), while Section 2 shows
that 54% of traded option contracts expires within 25 days. Due to this, the arbitrage strategy
mentioned turns then out to be simply not available, especially for contracts with shorter maturity.
A better synchronization of the MIBO30 and the FIB30 cycles might aﬀect the incidence of this
type of mispricing and improve the overall eﬃciency of the IDEM. 15
In Figure 5 we draw the daily distribution of the overall incidence of arbitrage opportunities to
check whether our findings may result being a simple artifact of corporate actions or other exceptional
market events. 16 This graph suggests that this can hardly be the case: the ratio of available arbitrage
opportunities is almost always above 40% and exceeds the sample average for long periods, especially
November 1999 — January 2000, when the market was more bullish. Among the “low arbitrage”
periods one finds also the months of June and July, those in which almost invariably dividends are
paid out. All in all, there does not seem to be strong evidence either of clustering of violations around
particular periods of the year or of large outliers driving the results in Table III.
4. The Role of Frictions
Whereas all the preceding conditions refer to a model of frictionless markets (such as Black and
Scholes (1973)), frictions are obviously important in real markets (see the extensive treatment in
Stoll (2000)). Therefore, a first way to look at the preceding results is to consider them as an
indication of the distance between models of asset prices and markets.
In a market with no “real” arbitrage opportunities, arbitrage profits deduced from theory should
indicate nothing but the amount paid by investors as commissions, margins, taxes, and the like. An
initial assessment of the role of frictions on the MIBO may then be simply obtained by computing the
15This characteristics of the IDEM remained unchanged through the subsequent reforms of the market structure.
16We are indebted to a referee for suggesting this possibility. Corporate events (like public oﬀerings) might induce
jumps in the price of options; in some periods trading in some components of the MIB30 index may be stopped to
avoid excess price oscillations. These events are likely to induce temporary misallignments between the underlying and
option prices that may appear as (apparent) arbitrage opportunities.
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exact amount of the arbitrage profits detected. This information is contained in Table III, in which
the average profits reported for each arbitrage condition may be simply interpreted as the average
level of the frictions implied by trading in the MIBO. The whole distribution of arbitrage profits —
rather than its mean — is quite interesting as well. It turns out that profits arising from conditions
other than (5)-(6) are rather concentrated around low levels and that almost 70% of the sample
of arbitrage profits are below 200 index points. Nevertheless, conditions (5) and (6) display much
higher profits so that the maximum arbitrage profits available for each contract have an empirical
distribution that is quite right-skewed, as illustrated in Figure 1.
When trying to understand the nature of such frictions, it is reasonable to restrict attention to
the following aspects:
1. Microstructural issues. Execution delays tend to make arbitrage profits risky, although au-
tomated market circuits reduce this phenomenon. Following Gould and Galai (1974), Nisbet
(1992), and Ackert and Tian (2000) we checked whether arbitrage opportunities are still avail-
able in the subsequent observation, i.e. whether arbitrage opportunities persist for at least
half-an-hour. We obtain results very similar to those reported in Tables III to V.
2. Taxation. Tax rates tend to be non proportional, depending on the overall fiscal position of
investors as, for example, whether they are home-based or not. We prefer to omit this element
rather than take a totally arbitrary approach.
3. Dividends. Although dividends are hardly known in advance, a rather common approach con-
sists of treating past dividends as a reliable forecast of future ones. Following this practice, we
incorporated into our data the dividend yield on the MIB30 index in 1998 (equal to 1.4251%):
our results remain virtually unchanged. We also investigated, in a few alternative ways, the
relevance of dividends implicit in the data, obtaining almost no practical eﬀect.17 We therefore
conclude that dividends can be omitted at little cost.
4. Interest rate risk. Changes in the interest rate imply a risk for arbitrageurs. We then computed
profits out of each investment by using interest rates of a corresponding maturity, obtained by
estimating the term structure of interest rates.18 This approach, nevertheless, does not have
noteworthy implications as the term structure of interest rates is considerably flat over this
period.19
5. Transaction costs. Prices appearing with a positive (resp. negative) sign in the above condi-
tions indicate that the arbitrage strategy considered is exploited by buying (resp. selling) the
corresponding asset. For this reason such prices should be computed at their ask (resp. bid)
value together with all commissions and fees involved in the transaction. Considering bid and
17We tried inferring dividends from: (i) the spot-future parity; (ii) the the put-call parity; (iii) the maturity spread
condition. Approximately 70% of the computed yields turns out to be slightly negative while the average yield is
approximately 0.02%.
18We use the cubic-splines method of estimation of the yield curve first introduced in McCulloch (1975).
19Including dividends and the term structure of interest rates produces a ratio of violations equal to 50.77%.
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ask values and other transaction costs has the clear eﬀect of raising the left hand side in all
the preceding inequalities i.e. of cutting the amount of arbitrage profits.
Bid/ask spreads (inclusive of all commissions and fees) turn out to be the only kind of frictions
likely to aﬀect the preceding results in a significant way. A direct assessment of this component is,
once again, less straightforward than it would appear at a first glance. This is mainly due to the well
documented fact that a large number of transactions are concluded at an eﬀective level of the spread
quite far from the one oﬃcially quoted (see Stoll (2000), Vijh (1990) and George and Longstaﬀ
(1991)). But further to this, and more importantly, our aim is not that of assessing the arbitrage
phenomenon at the level of costs which is likely to have prevailed. Motivated by our view on pricing
eﬃciency discussed in the introduction, we would rather provide a characterization of arbitrage as
a function of market costs as, we believe, eﬃciency is a concept involving both elements. For this
reason we shall artificially introduce diﬀerent levels of costs in the options prices included in our
data set and to compute, for each such level, the incidence of arbitrage opportunities and the level
of profits implied in them.
Of course there is a multiplicity of ways in which this experiment can be accomplished. The most
simple and clear from an economic viewpoint is, to our judgement, the one that follows. Letting α
and β be positive parameters, define on the basis of these bid and ask prices for the options and
the underlying simply by letting cbidt = (1− α) ct and caskt = (1 + α) ct in the case of a call and
Sbidt = (1− β)St and Saskt = (1 + β)St . Then the bid/ask spread is 2α and 2β for options and the
MIB30, respectively, and the mid price coincides with the actual value reported in our original data
set. We have found it appropriate to further impose α = β. It can be easily viewed that in this
choice is implicit the constraint that the spread be uniform across all characteristics of contracts
such as moneyness, maturity and the like. Although this is in contrast with the market practice,
it provides a consistent and meaningful measure of the aggregate level of trading costs implicit in
a given ratio of arbitrage opportunities; some alternatives will also be discussed. The results so
obtained are reported in Table III. Each column corresponds to a diﬀerent level of α, ranging from
0 to 10%; we then take the value α = 5% as a benchmark 20 and perform for this level of the spread
a few further investigations, reported in Table VI and Figure 5. Eventually, in Figures 2 to 4 we
plot as a function of α the ratio of arbitrage violations and the level of arbitrage profits.
Table III shows that for most arbitrage conditions, the incidence of violations rapidly converges
to zero as α increases. As for to the two sides of the put-call parity, although it is still clear that
violations of the short end occur more frequently than those of the long side, it is remarkable that the
high ratios of these violations quickly drop to zero as soon as α reaches about 2%. This is entirely
consistent with the findings of Cavallo and Mammola (2000) — implicitly suggesting that our choice
of the spread should not be inconsistent with the market data. However, other conditions, such as
20The reason for this choice is based on the simple approach proposed by Roll (1984) to compute the bid/ask spread
implicit in trade prices (for other models of the bid/ask spread see, among others, Stoll (1989), George et al. (1991) and
Huang and Stoll (1997)). Assuming that the spread is constant during each trading day (although possibly diﬀerent for
diﬀerent contracts), we obtain a time series for the bid/ask spread with average value equal to 8.95% which corresponds
to α = 4, 5%.
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box and maturity spreads remain important throughout the range of all the plausible values for α
we consider. For instance, at α = 4% the two box spread conditions still originate a 5% each of
violations, while the maturity spread condition is still at a very persistent 15%. This exercise shows
that some kinds of pricing ineﬃciencies are very persistent and that in particular condition (6b) is
scarcely influenced by the value of the transaction costs.21 As a result, the overall ratio of arbitrage
violations is quite slowly decreasing as a function of α, as illustrated in Figure 2. In Figure 4 we draw
essentially the same graph as in Figure 2 (but focusing on overall violations of arbitrage conditions
and violations of the maturity spread - long side, only) distinguishing between moneyness classes.
This is done in order to verify that our results apply to all segments of the market. It turns out that
a higher ratio of arbitrage opportunities is concentrated in the DITM segment but this diﬀerence
becomes irrelevant as long as α increase; furthermore, the ATM sector almost coincides with the
whole sample. For what concerns condition (6b), it turns out that it is exactly ATM options those
that are more seriously aﬀected by this arbitrage opportunity, while it is the DITM the one in which
such condition is least important.
Our results may be summarized as follows. First, even modest frictions can significantly reduce
the number of violations, implying that most of the violations detected in Section 3 actually corre-
sponded to very thin profit levels. For example, with α = 2% violations of the monotone spreads
(with respect to either strike or maturity) drop to about 1.6% thus confirming that our data set
is not aﬀected by systematic misrecordings. Second, as α increases the arbitrage conditions that
remain into play are the box and maturity (long) spreads. Third, it is not possible to completely
get rid of the mispricing even by raising α beyond reasonable thresholds (8% or more) as mispricing
persist in more than 2.5% of the sample. Although this number is not high enough to cast doubts
on the meaningfulness of our tests, it witnesses the existence of niches of pricing ineﬃciencies that
cannot be simply explained away by the existence of frictions.22
Table III also presents average level of profits which arise from the arbitrage opportunities de-
tected. A diminishing number of arbitrage opportunities does not imply that the surviving mispricing
cannot be anyway quite profitable. Figure 3 plots average arbitrage profit vs. the bid/ask spread α.
These plots confirm one of our previous conclusions: profits do not converge to zero as α increases.
On the contrary, average profits deriving from arbitrage strategies exploiting violations of conditions
such as the butterfly spread seem to be increasing with α. The reason for this puzzling behavior is
that higher bid/ask spreads have two eﬀects: (i) they discard from the sample of arbitrage oppor-
21A strong belief that the MIB30 was bound to rise during 1999 is a reasonable explanation for some of these
mispricings. For what concerns the spread conditions, observe that in these conditions the bid/ask spread is less
important than in others, given our assumptions. As a pure matter of scale the spread has high impact especially
when applied to the underlying (the MIB30 has a price which is several orders of magnitude higher than option
contracts). Since trading in the underlying is not required to exploit misspricings evidenced by the spread conditions,
increasing bid/ask spreads will reduce their percentage relevance very slowly.
22Longstaﬀ (1995) reports that violations deriving from conditions such as monotonic or butterfly do not reach 1.5%
of his sample, and the associated profits would amount to a few cents. In order to recover the same ratio in our data set
we would need to impose a value of α close to 6%, considerably higher than those documented by Longstaﬀ. Moreover,
residual profits would still be rather high.
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tunities those associated with a lower level of profits; (ii) they cut down the profitability of those
opportunities that remain in the sample. The combined eﬀect may result in a positive relationship
between profits and bid/ask spread whenever the number of low profit strategies is important. Fig-
ure 3 also stresses that the short edge of the put-call parity is on average, and independently of α,
much more profitable than the short hedge.
Table VI reports the sample distribution of the violations found by maturity and moneyness for
the scenarios α = 0 and α = 5% focussing only on the three conditions for which the incidence
of violations was the highest — i.e. butterfly, maturity, and box spreads — and the results relative
to all kinds of violations (‘Overall’). We find no evidence of strong patterns along the moneyness
dimension: when α = 5% the percentage of violations is always between 7 and 10 percent. On the
other hand, a distinct pattern exists along the maturity dimension as (again, assuming α = 5%) the
incidence of violating contracts steadily declines from 17 for very short-term options to 3 percent
for long-term contracts. This is not completely unexpected as the segment with less than 7 days
to expiration is universally considered illiquid and as such more prone to mispricings. However,
once more just disregarding the extreme segments of the implied volatility surface — i.e. deep in-
and out-of the money and short term contracts — does not change our finding that even admitting
frictions in the order of α = 5% at least 5− 6% of the available observations does violate one of the
three no-arbitrage conditions reported by Table VI.
Eventually, in Figure 5 we draw the daily distribution of the incidence of arbitrage opportunities
together with its average value, relatively to the value α = 5%. This chart confirms, as for the case
α = 0 discussed in the close of the preceding section, that our findings are not aﬀected by particular
outliers, as the series oscillates quite regularly across its mean. Once again we find evidence of the
fact that the concluding part of the sample would seem to be the one in which arbitrage opportunities
are more pervasive.
As we stressed above, on the real market the bid/ask spread is far from being uniform: in fact the
microstructure literature highlights that a uniform spread structure would be appropriate if order
processing were the unique costs incurred by market makers. According to IDEM rules upper bounds
for the spreads for each class of options are imposed as a function of moneyness. Nevertheless, in the
definition of such constraints both moneyness and the spread are expressed in absolute values, so
that the corresponding ratio of the spread to the option price may result being extremely wide 23 and
the choice of a “realistic” structure of the spreads quite problematic. For comparison, Ackert and
Tian (2000, p. 45) report that on the S&P 500 for contracts with price above (respectively, below)
$3 the bid ask spread was about 1/16 (respectively 1/32) of a point. Therefore the bid/ask spread
should be at least 2% for low price (DOTM) options and can be as high as 4% for medium price
options.24 In George and Longstaﬀ (1980) the percentage half spread, α, on the S&P100 options
23Philips and Smith (1980) report that for options with extremely low price the spread may even exceed 100%.
24Nisbet (1992, pp. 392-393) estimates transaction costs on the London Traded Options Market (LTOM) during
1988 finding 0.6% ≤ α ≤ 3.4%. Yadav and Pope (1994, pp. 925-926) investigate the market for futures on the FTSE
100 index between 1986 and 1990 estimating α ≤ 0.3%, i.e. substantially lower values. Longstaﬀ (1995) and George
and Longstaﬀ (1993) study the S&P 100 index options market (CBOE) 1988 and 1989: although they conclude that
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either is U shaped, with minimum for ATM options, or decreases the more the option is into the
money.
In order to take into account the role of moneyness — and given some of the stylized facts
mentioned in the literature — we also considered a scheme in which the level α of frictions is a function
of monetness. We assumed that the level of the spread applying to ATM options is increased by
25% for OTM or ITM options and by 50% for DOTM and DITM options. 25 The outcome of
this exercise is reported in Table IV. The main diﬀerence with Table III is that the incidence of
arbitrage opportunities declines more rapidly as α increases; on the other hand it is confirmed that
some conditions display a higher incidence ratio than others and, particularly, the Maturity Spread.
Observe though that the present choice of the structure of the spread implies, for each value of
α considered, a higher value of the average sample spread, which makes the comparison between
Tables III and IV less straightforward. In the first row of Table IV we then compute the average
level of the spread (“Eﬀective α”) given the sample distribution of moneyness (as reported in Table
II). If we compare each column of Table III with the column of Table IV of a corresponding level of
eﬀective α, we find that indeed these two schemes are much alike, or, equivalently, that it is the mean
spread which explains most of this figures, rather than its structure. For example, with a uniform
spread equal to 5% we find that almost 8% of the market allows for arbitrage; when the spread is
made to depend on moneyness and the resulting average spread is fixed at 4.83% (corresponding
to α = 4%) the incidence of arbitrage amounts to 8.26%. This analysis confirms that the choice of
a uniform spread structure is correct as long as the aggregate level of frictions is concerned. We
decided, however, to further test this conclusion.
It is recognized that, further to order processing, market makers face inventory costs arising
from the risk that the option may change value during the holding period, especially as a result of
a change in the underlying. This cost directly translates into the cost of hedging the corresponding
risk and it can be reasonably approximated by the product of the underlying volatility times the
delta of the option (see George and Longstaﬀ, p. 386). In fact, direct interviews with market makers
has confirmed that the Black and Scholes delta26 is the main parameter on which the bid/ask spread
is made to depend. We constructed then a further scheme for the bid/ask spread by dividing the
sample into four classes depending on the absolute value of the δ: |δ| < 25%, 25% ≤ |δ| < 50%,
50% ≤ |δ| < 75% and |δ| ≥ 75%. For a given level of α, we then fix the spread equal to α for the first
class, 1.25α for the second, 1.5α for the third and 1.75 for the fourth. The results obtained from this
exercise are reported in Table V. The comments relative to Table IV apply here almost unchanged:
the incidence is lower and decreases more rapidly as α increases. Once again, confronting the level
of α reported for Table II with the levels of eﬀective α reported for Table V illustrates how the
α varies considerably, the average bid/ask spread is 2.5%.
25We also considered the case in which the spread is a function of maturity as well as of moneyness. Tha way
the spread depends on the residual life is not clear nor in microstructure literature nor in the empirical invesigations
consulted (see George and Longstaﬀ (1993)).
26We recall that iIn the model of Black and Scholes the delta of a call contract is equal to δt = Φ
½
ln
St
k +(r+
1
2
σ2)τ
σ
√
τ
¾
,
where σ is the volatility and Φ is the cumulative normal distribution.
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prevailing diﬀerences are mainly due to the diﬀerent average levels of costs assumed.
In conclusion, the MIBOmarket is characterized by arbitrage opportunities even after considering
the role of transaction costs and other frictions. Even when plausible frictions for ATM and medium-
term contracts are considered, roughly 10% of the data still implies riskless profitable strategies.
Some ineﬃciency may actually be caused by the loose bounds on bid/ask spreads (when expressed
as ratios) mandated by the IDEM. Also, the current structure of the IDEM appears to be responsible
for some of the mispricing we have detected, especially for the most persistent ones that are not much
aﬀected by the introduction of frictions. For instance, we suspect that a relevant percentage of the
violations detected might be easily removed by improving the feasibility of synchronized trading (on
instruments with identical maturity) on the MIBO and FIB30 markets. On the other hand, there
is no doubt that the level of arbitrage profits detected after filtering for the bid/ask spread is not
negligeable. Finally, trading strategies triggering short positions in the index tend to exhibit higher
profitability, and this is maybe a consequence of the existence of portfolio constraints, particularly for
institutional investors. The latter is clearly a kind of market imperfection that cannot be accounted
for by any data analysis although we may conjecture that it does have significant role.
5. Informational Eﬃciency
A debated question in the literature concerns the informational content of implied volatility: If the
options market incorporates all available information through an eﬃcient pricing mechanism, then it
should not be possible to improve volatility forecasts over and above the volatility implied by option
prices.27 Sections 3 and 4 oﬀered indications against the null of pricing eﬃciency. Although the two
concepts of eﬃciency need not coincide,28 we suspect that an imperfect pricing mechanism may prove
unable to serve as an unbiased aggregator of beliefs. For instance, when the lower bound condition
is violated implied volatility takes on negative values whhich cannot represent sensible forecasts of
future, realized volatility: informational eﬃciency tests have routinely purged the data of these types
of mispricings. One naturally wonders whether removing records producing other types of arbitrage
violations might somehow aﬀect the results. In this section we pursue this approach in a systematic
fashion: after having reviewed a few standard techniques and developed a novel set of econometric
tools that appear to be particularly fit to the MIBO30 market, we proceed to test for informational
eﬃciency using data sets of variable quality, in the sense that variable percentages of mispricings
are removed from the sample before implementing the tests.29
A first issue in implementing this type of tests is defining the realized volatility of returns on
27Implied volatility is defined as the value of the volatility parameter (in annualized units) such that the observed
price of an option and its theoretical Black-Scholes value coincide.
28In fact a market unable to correctly reflect available information need not display arbitrage opportunities. In
principle, even the presence of mispricings violating no arbitrage conditions might be consistent with informational
eﬃciency, although we argue in the following that this is a harder case to defend.
29Most of the previous literature does not pay any attention to the eﬀects of arbitrage violations on the tests of
informational eﬃciency, apart from the preventive elimination of all prices violating the lower bound conditions (i.e.
of all negative IVs). Pricing eﬃciency is simply assumed.
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the underlying asset. Given a series of high-frequency MIB30 prices {Sj}τj=t we follow Canina and
Figlewski (1993) (CF for short) and define realized volatility between t and τ as the annualized
standard deviation of the continuously compounded MIB30 returns {Rj}τj=t+1:
s (t, τ) =
vuut 1
τ − t
τX
j=t+1
(Rj − R¯)2 (8)
Since in general we have observations on 15 half-an-hour periods per trading day, the annualized
volatility of the MIB30 can be simply obtained by multiplying the high-frequency s (t, τ) by the
square root of 15×252 = 3, 780. We call this quantity σ∗ (t, τ) . Analogous definitions apply to data
sampled at a diﬀerent frequency.
Assuming that at time t the IV on an option with maturity in τ > t represents the MIBO
market’s prediction of the future volatility over the interval [t, τ ] (Day and Lewis (1988)), a test of
rationality of this forecast can be obtained from the regression
σ∗ (t, τ) = α+ βIV (t, zt, τ) + u(t, zt, τ), (9)
(where E[u(t, τ)|zt] = 0 and zt is the information set available to the market at time t). The null
hypothesis is α = 0 and β = 1 so that E[σ∗ (t, τ) |zt] = IV (t, τ) (unbiasedness). Deviations of α
and/or β from the values 0 and 1 illustrate the presence of biases and hence irrationality of markets’
forecasts. The notation IV (t, zt, τ) stresses that at time t several IVs corresponding to diﬀerent
moneyness levels zt are available with maturity τ. Analogously, since IV (t, zt, τ) is maintained to be
formed by an eﬃcient market able to incorporate all available information into prices, if xt ∈ zt is
any piece of public information, then the (encompassing) regression
σ∗ (t, τ) = α+ βIV (t, zt, τ) + γxt + u(t, zt, τ) (10)
should still give α = 0, β = 1, and γ = 0. In the following we use two alternative definitions of
xt. First, following CF (p. 671) we employ a 30 (trading) days moving average of realized daily
volatility σ∗, appropriately annualized. CF use a 60-days average, but given our shorter sample size
(in terms of days, not of overall number of observations) we opt for 30 (CF expressly point out that
similar results were obtained using 30 instead of 60). Second, we set xt = IV (t − 1, zt, τ + 1), the
lagged implied volatility for an option with identical moneyness and maturity.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to simply estimate regressions (9)-(10) by OLS using all implied
volatilities corresponding to diﬀerent days/time of the day, moneyness, and time-to maturity levels.
At least three problems have been discussed in the literature:
1. Since the observations come from a panel, the random disturbances u(t, zt, τ) are unlikely to
be spherical, i.e. to have identical variance and to be uncorrelated. For instance, it is plausible
that because of the lower liquidity, certain categories of contracts (DITM and DOTM) be
characterized by more volatile random shocks, a source of heteroskedasticity. Similarly, in a
high frequency data set certain periods of the day (like opening, lunch time, etc.) may display
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more volatile random influences. Finally, it is possible that disturbances be correlated across
moneyness classes and/or across maturities. It is well known that in these circumstances
OLS estimates are ineﬃcient and would produce a biased estimate of the covariance matrix.
Notice that these issues uniquely derive from the panel nature of the data, i.e. they cannot
be simply removed by careful choice of the sampling method. Of course, one solution is to
break down the panel in one or more time series. For instance, CF apply tests (9)-(10) to 32
classes defined by moneyness and maturity. The problem with this approach is that, at least
in principle, contradictory answers may be reached on heterogenous classes. Christensen and
Prabhala (1998, CP for short) focus instead on the 1-month, ATM segment of the S&P 100
options market. There is obviously a trade-oﬀ between the quantity of information lost in the
process and the clarity of the results that are achievable.
2. As stressed by both CF and CP, even in pure time series tests the disturbances u(t, zt, τ) will
be serially correlated if the sampling method uses overlapping observations. From (8) it is
clear that given τ, σ∗ (t, τ) will share τ − k terms with the set of realized historical volatili-
ties {σ∗ (t+ k, τ)}τk=1. This introduces dependence in the regressands of (9)-(10). The same
phenomenon aﬀects 30 days moving averages of realized daily volatility. Standard econometric
theory suggests that OLS estimators have poor finite sample properties and that their tradi-
tional standard errors are likely to be understated. CF oﬀer a partial solution to the problem
by calculating autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in a GMM framework. CP oﬀer a
ultimate solution that relies on avoiding the use of overlapping observations altogether.
3. CP and Jorion (1995) provide strong arguments that would indicate that IV (t, zt, τ) might be
plagued by substantial measurement errors. Errors-in-variables are known to bias downwards
the OLS estimates of the coeﬃcient associated with an imprecisely measured regressor: this
would easily cause (9) to reject unbiasedness. Moreover, provided IV (t, zt, τ ) and σ∗ (t, τ )
are positively correlated, the OLS estimate of γ in (10) might be also biased upwards, causing
rejections of the eﬃciency hypothesis. As illustrated in CP, the solution consists in adopting an
instrumental variable approach to the estimation of (9)-(10). This problem is equally serious
in panel and pure time series regression models.
In the following we implement a number of strategies. We approach the problem of the non-
sphericality of the random disturbances in three alternative ways. First, as in CF, we apply GMM
estimation to high-frequency time series concerning separate contract classes defined in terms of
time-to-maturity and moneyness (Section 5.1). In practice, this is equivalent to OLS estimation
with corrections applied in the form of an autocorrelation-consistent estimator of the covariance
matrix. The disadvantage is that multiple sets of estimates are obtained for (9)-(10). Second,
after transforming the available data set, we apply feasible GLS estimation to each separate class
of moneyness/maturity (Section 5.2). In their discussion of CF results, CP experiment with FGLS
stressing that , similarly to the instrumental variables method, they provide consistent estimates
in the presence of autocorrelated errors. Once more, multiple estimates emerge, one per contract
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class. Third, we estimate the regression coeﬃcients using Parks’ (1967) two-stage panel method
(Section 5.3). To our knowledge this method has never been applied. It oﬀers the advantage of
imposing structure useful to deal with the presence of serial correlation (both originating from
the panel structure and from the use of overlapping observations) and heteroskedasticity in the
errors. Moreover, it provides a unique estimate of the coeﬃcients in (9)-(10). We also deal with two
additional concerns. In Section 5.4 we apply CF-style GMM estimation to daily, closing observations
for ATM options only. In fact, the use of high-frequency, transactions data might introduce in the
analysis uncontrolled amounts of noise, possibly driving the results. A streamline exercise based on
daily observations for the most liquid segment of the market helps shedding light on the issue. In
Section 5.5 we experiment with CP’s instrumental variable method. We apply their methods both to
daily, closing, overlapping and non-overlapping observations for ATM options 15 days to maturity.
All of these tests lead to quite a uniform conclusion: the MIBO market seems to couple pricing
and informational ineﬃciencies in large amounts. Moreover, the fact that either the original data
described in Section 2 or that the arbitrage-free data derived in Section 4 be used in the econometric
tests turns out to be inconsequential.
5.1. GMM Tests
Similarly to CF, we subject our data to a reduction process by which, for each recorded trading
time, we extract only 20 observations, corresponding to all possible combinations of 5 categories of
moneyness (DOTM, OTM, ATM, ITM, DITM) and 4 categories of time-to-maturity (very short,
short, medium, long). The classes of moneyness and time-to-expiration are defined as in Section
2. It often happens that a given moneyness class contains multiple observations. In these cases we
extract the observation with the lowest (highest) moneyness in the case of DOTM (DITM) options,
and simply use the mid-point observation based on a moneyness ranking for the remaining three
classes. Since our high frequency sample consists of 3,434 observations over time, the resulting panel
data set is in principle composed of 68,680 observations, thus implying a minimal loss of information.
In practice, it turns out that a few classes of moneyness are missing; especially in the case of time-
to-maturity, at most two classes are simultaneously present throughout the sample. The ‘reduced’
data set consists of 21,240 observations.30
Define θ ≡ [α β]0, xi≡ [1 IVi]0 , X =
£
x1 x2 ... xNm,τ
¤0
and let Nm,τ denote the total number of
observations (over time) that fall in a given class of moneyness and time-to-maturity (indexed by
m, τ). CF estimate (9)-(10) by GMM using data for each separate class of contracts. Although the
point estimates of the regressor coeﬃcients are identical to OLS, the advantage of this estimation
30Descriptive statistics for each of the 20 classes show that contract categories are represented in a balanced way,
although (as it is to be expected) long-term, deep ITM and OTM contracts are under-represented (less than 1,000
observations each). A table is available from the Authors upon request.
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method is that the resulting estimate of the covariance matrix of the estimators,
Cov
³
θˆGMMm,τ
´
= (X 0X)−1

N−1m,τ
Nm,τX
i=1
uˆ2ixix
0
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−1
m,τ
Nm,τX
i=1
Nm,τX
j=i+1
Ii,j uˆiuˆj(xix0j + xjx
0
i)

 (X 0X)−1,
(11)
is robust to arbitrary forms of correlation in the errors u(t, zt, τ) arising from the fact that contracts
overlap. In particular, the indicator variable Ii,j = 1 if and only if two observations are associated
with overlapping contracts, and zero otherwise. By running a few Monte Carlo experiments, CF
show that for the problem at hand even in small samples the standard errors extracted from (11)
are quite accurate. Table VIII reports the results for the original data set. Although αˆGMM is never
significant, βˆ
GMM
is also never close to 1; in 12 cases out of 20 βˆ
GMM
is not significantly diﬀerent
from zero, in one case it is significantly negative. The R2 coeﬃcients are in general very small,
between 0.38% for OTM, very short-term options and 15% for ATM, very short-term contracts. For
the 7 classes of contracts for which αˆGMM is statistically nil while βˆ
GMM
> 0, βˆ
GMM
is always
statistically less than one and in 6 cases the IVs anyway fail the encompassing tests (10). In general,
a moving window volatility index calculated on high frequency MIB30 returns seems to have a good
forecasting power (theR2 in the encompassing regression always doubles), although the sign of γˆGMM
is significantly negative for 13 categories of contracts, possibly an indication of mean reversion. All
in all, this battery of tests reveals strong informational ineﬃciency of the MIBO market.
Our findings improve only slightly when GMM methods are applied to arbitrage-free data. This
confirms that pricing eﬃciency is not suﬃcient for informational eﬃciency to result. Table IX reports
on the arbitrage-free data set estimates: we obtain higher values for the R2s (38% for OTM, short-
term options). However, with the only exception of ITM short-term contracts (that anyway fail the
encompassing tests), it remains true that the estimated slope coeﬃcients are in general quite small,
often not even significantly positive (occasionally significantly negative), which is again inconsistent
with informational eﬃciency.
5.2. Feasible GLS Tests
Write a generic cross-sectional regression for time t as
yt = β0ι20 +Xtβ + ut
where E[ut] = 0 and E[utu0t] = Σt. yt collects the ex-post realized volatility between time t and
t + τ , while the matrix Xt contains the regressors, IV (t, zt, τ) in (9) and [IV (t, zt, τ) xt]0 in (10).
Let’s stack the T = 3, 434 observations on the diﬀerent times in the sample and write the model in
compact fashion as:
Y = β0 +Xβ1 + u.
Following Parks (1967), we initially assume Σt is constant over time and that no serial correlation
patterns be present, so that the overall covariance matrix of the IV errors can be eﬀectively described
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by Ω = Σ⊗ IT . It is well known that the GLS estimator
βˆGLS = (X 0ΩX)−1X 0ΩY
is consistent and eﬃcient, and also yields consistent estimates of the covariance matrix of the es-
timated coeﬃcients, (X 0ΩX)−1. Unfortunately, Ω is unknown and must be first replaced by a
consistent estimate, such as
bΩOLS = ΣˆOLS ⊗ IT = "T−1 TX
t=1
(uˆOLSt )(uˆ
OLS
t )
0
#
⊗ IT
where uˆOLSt = yˆt−βˆ
OLS
0 ι20−X0tβˆ
OLS
. The resulting estimator, βˆFGLS =
³
X 0bΩOLSX´−1X 0bΩOLSY,
is called the feasible (F)GLS. Under a variety of conditions (see Parks (1967)) it has been shown to
be consistent and unbiased.31
We estimate equations (9)-(10) by FGLS separately for each of the 20 classes of moneyness/time
to maturity. This choice remarkably simplifies the econometrics, since with only one observation
per day we only have to worry about serial correlation of the disturbances. Table IXI presents the
results. Panel A refers to the original data: for all classes, IVs fail the rationality tests as predictors
of future MIB30 volatility during the life of the contract. The intercept is significantly positive (with
p-values systematically below 5%) for all classes of contracts. On the other hand, the slope is most
of the time (12 out of 20 cases) not statistically diﬀerent from zero, and when it is diﬀerent from
zero it is often negative (7 cases). In general the coeﬃcients are very small, and the maximum R2
is 0.0245. Overall, also with this method our first data set seems to strongly reject the hypothesis
of informational eﬃciency of the MIBO market. These results are similar – if not stronger – to
those of CF. Panel B oﬀers a very similar picture for the arbitrage-free data set. Improvements are
minimal, in the sense that only one of the estimated α fails to be statistically significant, while there
are still four β coeﬃcients which are significantly negative; the R2 coeﬃcient generally increases,
but the fundamental idea is still that options’ IVs contain only partial and biased information on
realized volatility.
5.3. Panel Regressions
The assumption of Σt constant over time is easily rejected by most data sets. In our case, it is
likely that forecast errors might be long-lived and hence serially correlated. Therefore we follow
Parks (1967) two-stage method resort to a further step to jointly take into account the presence
of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, phenomena made extremely likely by the high frequency
nature of our data. We regress (by OLS) the panel residuals on their lagged values and estimate the
matrix R in the multivariate model
uˆFGLSt = Ruˆ
FGLS
t−1 + νt (12)
31Asymptotically, it is also equivalent to the MLE and therefore is fully eﬃcient. Even in the absence of normality,
it can be interpreted as a pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation that retains all the asymptotic properties of MLE
estimators (see Gourie´roux and Monfort (1984)).
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where νt is spherical. Finally, we apply OLS to the (so called Prais-Winsten) transformed model
yt − Rˆyt−1 = β0(I − Rˆ) + (Xt −XtRˆ)β + νt,
which yields consistent and eﬃcient estimates of βˆParks0 and βˆ
Parks
1 , along with an unbiased estimate
of their covariance matrix.
In practice, for the original data we find that the first-stage, FGLS residual do indeed display a
high degree of persistence (ρˆ = 0.999). Therefore we apply the second stage of Parks’s method. We
estimate by OLS the model:
uˆFGLSt = ρI20uˆ
FGLS
t−1 + νt,
a simplification of (12) to the case in which serial correlation is common in intensity to all classes
of option contracts. Since we do not have any reason to suspect that random disturbances have a
diﬀerent persistence as a function of moneyness and/or maturity, and this assumption simplifies the
task, we proceed to derive our final estimates from the Pras-Winsten modified regression:
yt − bρyt−1 = α(1− bρ) + (Xt − bρXt)β + νt.
We thus find (p-values in parenthesis):
σ∗ (t, τ) = 0.213
(0.0000)
− 0.0027
(0.0000)
IV (t, zt, τ) + u(t, zt, τ).
The R2 is of 0.8% only. Using the same econometric techniques we obtain a much higher explanatory
power by estimating the encompassing regressions
σ∗ (t, τ) = 0.360
(0.0000)
− 0.0021
(0.0000)
IV (t, zt, τ)− 0.8754
(0.0000)
σ∗MA (t− 30, t) + u(t, zt, τ) (R2 = 0.2183)
σ∗ (t, τ) = 0.214
(0.0000)
− 0.0037
(0.0000)
IV (t, zt, τ)− 0.0025
(0.0000)
IV (t− 1, zt, τ) + u(t, zt, τ) (R2 = 0.0105).
Particularly in the first case, the R2 is quite high, and simple 30-days rolling window standard
deviations forecasts future MIB30 volatility much better than IVs. As expected, the MIBO market
simultaneously displays pricing and informational ineﬃciencies. In the case of the arbitrage-free data,
the results are very similar. Through the same steps above, the forecasting regression is estimated
to be:
σ∗ (t, τ) = 0.237
(0.0000)
− 0.0003
(0.1169)
IV (t, zt, τ) + u(t, zt, τ).
Although the panel estimate of the common β stops being significantly negative, this is meaningless
as IV forecasts remain largely biased and the R2 negligible. We find confirmation that the clues of
informational ineﬃciency are strong and probably unrelated to pricing eﬃciency.32
32Results from encompassing regressions are similar to those from original data and therefore not reported. In-
terestingly, rejections at the GMM or FGLS level for most option classes need not imply an overall rejection when
panel methods are used. The reason is twofold: first, only using panel methods one eﬀectively takes into account of
the presence of heteroskedasticity; second, there is no general result concerning the ranking of standard errors when
corrections are applied using a HAC-type blanket approach vs. modeling the possible patterns of heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation.
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5.4. Tests on Daily, ATM Prices
We extract from our high-frequency data set a smaller sub-sample of closest-ATM, closing prices. For
each day in the sample and all traded maturities, we take the 5:25 p.m. observations as representative
of closing prices. We then select the closest-ATM contract, either put or call. This procedure returns
a sample of 356 observations. Maturities are between a minimum of 1 day to a maximum of 108 days.
ATM contracts, especially of short- to medium-term are the most actively traded ones; equivalently,
their prices are unlikely to be stale. Replication of the tests of Sections 5.1-5.3 based on liquid
contracts only ought to shield us from the possibility that high-frequency data might contain too
much noise to allow options implied volatilities to emerge as unbiased and eﬃcient forecasts of future
volatility.33
In the following we limit ourselves to report results for the GMM-based tests first proposed by
CF and for the case xt ≡ σ∗MA (t− 30, t) only. We obtain the following estimates of (9)-(10) (p-values
in parenthesis):
σ∗ (t, τ) = 0.106
(0.5353)
+ 0.275
(0.0000)
IV (t, τ) + u(t, τ) (R2 = 0.0269) (13)
σ∗ (t, τ) = 0.141
(0.4133)
+ 0.400
(0.000)
IV (t, τ)− 0.359
(0.0000)
σ∗MA (t− 30, t) + u(t, τ ) (R2 = 0.0762). (14)
Notably, the rationality regression provides indications that are only mildly unfavorable to the
hypothesis of eﬃciency of the MIBO market: αˆ is no longer significant, while βˆ becomes now sig-
nificantly positive. However, the null that βˆ = 1 can be still rejected at all significance levels. The
encompassing regression still gives negative results: although IVs become now significant in explain-
ing future realized volatility, past realized volatility remains significant and displays a coeﬃcient of
roughly the same magnitude as IVs. As in Table VIII, the estimated coeﬃcient for 30-days rolling
window standard deviation is negative. The R2 obtained by including past historical volatility
increases, from 2.7% to 7.6%.34
5.5. Measurement Error Issues. Tests on Non-Overlapping Data.
CP stress that the estimates in CF might be plagued by substantial measurement error problems
concerning the IVs, due for instance to misspecification of the Black-Scholes model from which
options volatilities are implied. Therefore they present an instrumental variables procedure that
ought to help avoid biases in the OLS estimates of (9)-(10) and hence incorrect conclusions from tests
of market eﬃciency. In the following we apply CP’s algorithms to the same sample of daily, closing
33As an added payoﬀ, using ATM options only gets around the issue of the existence of a ‘smile’ of implied volatility
in MIBO prices. Chernov (2001) shows that even in the presence of stochastic volatility (the most plausible reason
for the existence of the smile), ATM Black-Scholes implied volatility contains a negligible bias in forecasting realized
volatility over the remaining life of a contract.
34We further break down the closing ATM sample based on time-to-maturity of the included options. To this purpose
we use the same maturity classes defined in Section 2. No material diﬀerences along the maturity dimension emerge.
We also perform tests based on arbitrage-free, daily closing prices. However, since the two data sets diﬀer by a modest
number of observations, the test results are similar and therefore omitted.
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ATM prices used in Section 5.4. This choice simplifies calculations, makes the econometric problem
standard (instrumental variable estimation in panel environments is all but straightforward), and
has logical foundation in the finding that (13) represents the instance in which the least unfavorable
results to the eﬃciency hypothesis were found. Estimation is performed by standard two-stages least
squares (TSLS) algorithms.
As in CP, for given maturity t+ τ , past implied volatility IV (t − k, τ + k), k ≥ 1, is a natural
instrument: for instance the first five k-th order autocorrelations are all in excess of 0.5 for short-
term (τ ∈ [8, 25]) and medium-term contracts (τ ∈ [26, 50]); moreover, they are all highly significant
in statistical terms. Hence it is plausible that IV (t−k, τ +k) be highly correlated with the true but
unobserved implied volatility; furthermore, being separated by at least k calendar days, it is likely
that IV (t−k, τ+k) be unrelated to the measurement error associated with implied volatility k days
later. As in CP (p. 138) we also employ past historical volatility σ∗MA as an additional instrument.
In the following we set k = 3 and investigate the TSLS versions of (9)-(10) for closing, near-ATM,
short- and medium-term option prices only.35 The first-stage estimates are:
(short-term) IV (t, τ) = 0.088
(0.0000)
+ 0.416
(0.0000)
IV (t− 3, τ + 3) + 0.297
(0.0000)
σ∗MA (t− 33, t− 3) + ε(t, τ)
(medium-term) IV (t, τ) = 0.048
(0.0121)
+ 0.645
(0.0000)
IV (t− 3, τ + 3) + 0.188
(0.0017)
σ∗MA (t− 33, t− 3) + ε(t, τ).
The second-stage estimates are then obtained from (9) when IV (t, τ) is replaced by the residuals
derived from the first-stage regressions (standard errors are appropriately adjusted):
(short-term) σ∗ (t, τ) = − 0.138
(0.0000)
+ 1.326
(0.0000)
IV (t, τ) + u(t, τ) (R2 = 0.371)
(medium-term) σ∗ (t, τ) = 0.092
(0.0571)
+ 0.398
(0.0606)
IV (t, τ) + u(t, τ) (R2 = 0.026).
We obtain evidence that measurement error issues are unlikely to drive our results in Section 5.4:
the null that βˆ = 1 may be rejected on both maturity class; in fact, for medium term options we
cannot even reject the hypothesis that βˆ is zero, and for short-term contracts there evidence that
βˆ > 1 (the standard error of βˆ is 0.137). For short-term ATM options, also the null of αˆ = 0 fails to
be rejected in tests of standard size.36
CP (pp. 144-147) also stress that sampling procedures that allow options maturities to overlap
induce upward biases in the explanatory power of past historical volatility in regressions like (10).
Therefore they build a time series of non-overlapping ATM implied volatilities for contracts one
month to expiration and find that S&P 100 index options may actually reflect unbiased estimates
of future, realized volatility. One additional concern about our results is therefore related to the
use of overlapping data. As a final robustness check, we distill a non-overlapping sample of near
ATM, closing option prices with maturity of 15 days from our 10 month high-frequency data set.
35We also estimate regressions with k = 2 and 4 without noticing relevant changes in the estimated coeﬃcients.
k = 1 is probably not a good instrument as with daily observations, it is possible that some correlation may exist
between IV (t−1, τ+1) and measurement errors. We do not present results for very-short term and long term contracts
as these sub-samples fail to span in a uniform manner the period April 1999 - January 2000.
36The second-stage estimates for (10) also reject the null of informational eﬃciency.
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Clearly, the resulting sample of observations is necessarily short, 14 non-overlapping observations
only. Estimation of (9)-(10) on this non-overlapping data set gives:
σ∗ (t, τ) = 0.015
(0.9047)
+ 0.634
(0.2212)
IV (t, τ) + u(t, τ) (R2 = 0.2808)
σ∗ (t, τ) = 0.253
(0.2650)
− 1.858
(0.3545)
IV (t, τ) + 2.065
(0.2209)
σ∗MA (t− 30, t) + u(t, τ) (R2 = 0.5283).
None of the coeﬃcients is significant. However unbiasedness and eﬃciency can be rejected as the null
of βˆ = 0 is supported by both regressions. It would be of course interesting to replicate CP’s tests on
longer series of non-overlapping MIBO data. On the other hand, these results shows that overlapping
sampling methods are unlikely to be responsible for the finding of informational ineﬃciency of the
MIBO.37
6. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the pricing and informational eﬃciency of the Italian market for options on
the most important stock index, the MIB30. We find several indications inconsistent with previous
findings in the literature (see Cavallo and Mammola (2000)) that have led to the conclusion that
the Italian MIBO30 is quite an eﬃcient options market favoring risk-sharing activities and unbiased
aggregation and dissemination of information. On the opposite, we report that a striking percentage
of the data consists of option prices violating some basic no-arbitrage condition. This percentage
declines but never becomes negligible when we relax the no-arbitrage restrictions to accommodate
for the presence of bid/ask spreads and other frictions. The result holds generally for all levels
of moneyness and time-to-expiry. We also tentatively map the presence of niches of resilient arbi-
trage opportunities to a few microstructural features of the Italian derivatives market, such as the
mismatch between the calendar cycle of futures (FIB30) and options markets, and the fact that max-
imum bid/ask spreads are set in absolute values and therefore can be particularly wide for low-price
contracts (DOTM). Finally, using a variety of econometric tools and approaches for the treatment of
our high-frequency panel, we investigate the informational eﬃciency of the MIBO and conclude that
option prices are indeed very poor aggregators and predictors of future volatility of MIB30 returns.
There are many possible extensions of this work. First, we feel that a better comprehension of
the eﬀects of market microstructure would be highly desirable. To this end, it would be interesting
to consider making frictions and costs endogenous, as the outcome of the maximizing behavior
of market makers. Clearly this would also imply the need for a more detailed data set including
the characteristics of the trader, etc. (practically, using information from market makers’ books).
Second, although Section 5 insists on checking the robustness of the results on informational eﬃciency
to the existence of basic arbitrage violations, we believe that our understanding of the relationship
between these two basic components of market eﬃciency should be improved. Third, given our
37CP also argue that a possible cause of diﬀerence relative to results in CF is their use of pre-October 1987 crash
data. There is evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the way index options were priced before and after the crash.
However, in our (in fact, rather short) sample we fail to find any evidence of outliers in MIB30 returns or interest
rates, of unusual volatility in stock or bond returns, and of significant regulatory changes.
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conclusions on the eﬃciency of the MIBO market, we need to stress that our results are strictly
sample-specific, i.e. we cannot rule out that the market might have evolved in a much more eﬃcient
allocative and operative mechanism in the three years following the end of our sample. The reform
of the IDEM rules that has taken place in the following years points in this direction. 38Only more
data and repeated tests will allow financial economists to reach firm conclusions.
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Table I 
Summary Statistics. 
Summary statistics of the financial prices (options, the MIB30 index, and the interest rate) used in the paper. All the 
values are expressed in MIB30 index points. MIB30 index returns are continuously compounded and annualized. 
 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev. 
Call prices 1 5,260 1,003.99 855.41  
Put prices 1 4,300 882.25 667.97  
All contracts - price 1 5,260 942.55 768.97  
Strike price 31,000 44,000 37,500 3,968.63  
Residual Life 1 109 26.07 16.93  
Black-Scholes implied volatility 0.0393 1.5474 0.2548 0.0775  
ATM – BS implied volatility 0.0515 0.7755 0.2437 0.0477  
MIB30 index 31,518 43,476 35,821 2,923.63  
MIB30 index returns (%) -107.15 68.22 0.141 0.178  
Risk-free Rate (LIBOR) 2.48 3.54 2.99 0.3605  
 
 
Table II 
Summary Statistics – Percentage Composition of the Data Set By Moneyness  
and Time to Maturity. 
Moneyness is measured by KSz = for a call option and SKz = for a put option. In the case of a call, moneyness 
classes correspond to: 95.0<z  (DOTM), 98.095.0 <≤ z  (OTM), 02.198.0 ≤≤ z  (ATM), 05.102.1 ≤< z  (ITM) 
and z<05.1  (DITM). The classes for time to maturity (τ) are defined as follows: 7≤τ  (Very Short), 257 ≤<τ  
(Short), 5025 ≤<τ  (Medium), 9050 ≤<τ  (Long) and 90>τ  (Very Long). 
 
 
 Very Short Short Medium Long Very Long Total 
DOTM 1,29  5,13  5,69 0,69 0,01  12,81  
OTM 2,55  9,97  9,02 2,25 0,13  23,92  
ATM 4,36  15,76  13,75 3,39 0,22  37,48  
ITM 2,14  8,12  5,97 1,29 0,10  17,62  
DITM 1,06  3,62  3,03 0,39 0,07  8,16  
Total 11,40  42,60  37,46 8,01 0,52  100  
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Table III 
Arbitrage Opportunities with Bid/Ask Spreads: Percentage Incidence and Average Profits. 
The table reports the percentage ratio (on the total sample size), and the average profit deriving from violations of the 
no-arbitrage conditions listed in the first column of the table, and under the structure of transaction costs assumed in 
Section 4. Each column refers to a different half-size of the bid/ask spreads for options and spot index markets. 
These scenario simulations impose the restriction α = β. In the last line (“Overall”) we report the percentage of 
contracts violating at least one of the preceding conditions except the maturity spread and the average of the 
maximum arbitrage profits. 
  Half-size of the bid-ask spread (α) 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
% 3.12 0.35 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00L. Bound 
π 349.26 919.90 600.02 698.60 109.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 1.77 1.68 1.63 1.58 1.55 1.50 1.47 1.42 1.35 1.30 1.23Strike Mon. 
π 231.47 227.18 217.99 209.96 199.74 192.28 181.33 173.24 167.89 160.11 154.47
% 2.98 1.77 1.19 0.82 0.54 0.39 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.12Rev. Mon. 
π 114.63 141.53 160.35 179.99 220.91 260.73 325.25 370.04 422.17 478.98 519.22
% 14.48 8.80 5.42 3.53 2.25 1.53 1.05 0.77 0.61 0.52 0.45Butterfly 
π 61.11 65.44 72.07 77.34 88.77 101.20 120.71 143.90 162.49 173.92 188.23
% 23.08 15.41 9.80 6.51 4.59 3.39 2.63 2.13 1.73 1.42 1.14Box– Short 
π 150.47 177.47 231.22 301.65 383.40 476.71 574.07 669.89 786.42 923.65 1109.87
% 21.66 13.77 8.16 5.04 3.25 2.09 1.36 0.95 0.69 0.50 0.40Box – Long 
π 89.95 91.28 102.49 115.75 130.31 153.10 188.25 223.72 263.75 322.10 357.53
% 24.64 0.34 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00P/C – Short 
π 127.17 1905.29 1696.55 1287.55 823.86 499.51 65.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 15.26 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00P/C – Long 
π 80.31 677.53 323.24 186.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Mat. Mon. 
π 130.37 142.63 151.60 194.03 167.19 133.19 143.63 85.07 43.37 0.00 0.00
% 0.29 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00Mat. – Short 
π 93.60 102.45 99.86 126.28 132.16 120.45 106.22 70.91 82.03 94.94 34.57
% 17.69 17.43 17.12 16.72 16.09 15.32 14.52 13.41 12.21 10.97 9.78Mat. – Long 
π 394.81 364.04 334.30 306.15 282.26 261.26 241.09 226.93 215.64 207.50 200.90
% 51.74 33.35 22.51 15.34 10.84 7.97 6.08 4.91 4.07 3.45 2.97Overall  
π 165.23 153.88 170.55 202.56 243.91 292.82 349.02 399.55 452.24 505.27 560.80
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Table IV 
Arbitrage Opportunities with Bid/Ask Spreads as a Function of Moneyness: Percentage 
Incidence and Average Profits. 
This table is entirely analogous to table III save that costs are modeled as a function of moneyness. In particular, the 
value of α reported in each columns refers to the spread for ATM options. If the option is OTM or ITM the spread is 
increased by 25% with respect to ATM; if the option is dOTM or dITM then the spread is increased by 50% with 
respect to ATM. 
 
  Half-size of the bid-ask spread (α) 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Effective α  0 1.21 2.42 3.63 4.83 6.04 7.25 8.46 9.67 10.88 12.09 
% 3.12 0.35 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00L. Bound 
π 349.26 918.29 597.58 692.64 100.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 1.77 1.67 1.59 1.54 1.49 1.43 1.39 1.31 1.22 1.17 1.08Strike Mon. 
π 231.47 225.64 217.46 207.80 196.90 186.82 175.85 168.53 163.45 153.62 149.69
% 2.98 1.77 1.19 0.82 0.54 0.39 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.12Rev. Mon. 
π 114.63 141.53 160.35 179.99 220.91 260.73 325.25 370.04 422.17 478.98 519.22
% 14.48 7.91 4.45 2.60 1.57 0.97 0.70 0.53 0.43 0.38 0.33Butterfly 
π 61.11 65.88 72.91 82.10 98.51 124.57 147.47 170.45 189.32 194.62 202.53
% 23.08 14.14 8.24 5.15 3.47 2.52 1.94 1.47 1.11 0.88 0.74Box– Short 
π 150.47 184.01 254.48 349.08 463.60 588.21 714.89 897.99 1142.74 1390.72 1619.26
% 21.66 12.43 6.65 3.77 2.17 1.31 0.84 0.58 0.44 0.33 0.29Box – Long 
π 89.95 91.35 104.85 121.83 149.70 187.26 238.08 289.42 330.02 386.24 404.02
% 24.64 0.34 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00P/C – Short 
π 127.17 1921.58 1682.24 1272.51 796.47 440.38 73.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 15.26 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00P/C – Long 
π 80.31 671.72 315.89 173.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Mat. Mon. 
π 130.37 128.47 139.31 138.39 143.63 55.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 0.29 0.15 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Mat. – Short 
π 93.60 92.41 109.31 147.91 113.80 66.42 45.90 21.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 17.69 17.28 16.75 15.88 15.05 14.08 12.95 11.82 10.57 9.34 8.40Mat. – Long 
π 394.81 359.64 327.27 302.76 278.70 258.67 243.29 229.77 221.20 216.00 207.39
% 51.74 31.08 19.30 12.32 8.26 5.92 4.60 3.67 3.00 2.57 2.26Overall  
π 165.23 156.66 181.38 225.44 285.60 353.48 416.27 485.75 560.77 624.90 681.69
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Table V 
Arbitrage Opportunities with Bid/Ask Spreads as a Function of the Option Delta: 
Percentage Incidence and Average Profits. 
This table is entirely analogous to table III save that the parameter α corresponding to the bid/ask spread is no longer 
assumed to be constant but rather an increasing function of the absolute value of the delta of the option. The sample 
of option contracts is divided into four classes of possible values of δ : %25≤δ , %50%25 ≤< δ , 
%75%50 ≤< δ  and δ<%75 . The value of the spread applied to each class is respectively: α, 1.25α 1.5α and 
1.75α, where the value assigned to α appears in the first row. In the second line of the table it is computed the average 
level of the spread across the whole sample for given value of α. 
 
  Half-size of the bid-ask spread (α) 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Effective α  0 1.34 2.68 4.02 5.36 6.70 8.04 9.38 10.72 12.06 13.40 
% 3.12 0.35 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00L. Bound 
π 349.26 918.20 597.58 692.64 100.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 1.77 1.66 1.60 1.55 1.49 1.43 1.35 1.26 1.18 1.12 1.03Strike Mon. 
π 231.47 223.71 211.06 197.10 185.33 173.76 163.24 155.59 147.21 137.02 130.79
% 2.98 1.42 0.77 0.43 0.26 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06Rev. Mon. 
π 114.63 148.72 186.60 248.71 330.80 408.27 470.68 539.87 610.05 743.77 765.48
% 14.48 7.19 3.85 2.14 1.31 0.88 0.67 0.54 0.47 0.43 0.38Butterfly 
π 61.11 66.24 72.80 84.43 100.88 120.70 137.00 150.93 153.59 151.23 151.70
% 23.08 12.48 6.67 4.04 2.74 1.98 1.48 1.09 0.82 0.67 0.58Box– Short 
π 150.47 199.08 296.75 419.75 557.89 710.55 897.08 1156.52 1494.92 1781.43 2008.46
% 21.66 10.73 5.18 2.67 1.43 0.83 0.54 0.39 0.30 0.24 0.18Box – Long 
π 89.95 95.73 114.34 139.94 182.92 241.45 306.43 359.62 406.05 446.44 533.68
% 24.64 0.34 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00P/C – Short 
π 127.17 1920.93 1711.42 1278.84 807.45 463.56 69.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 15.26 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00P/C – Long 
π 80.31 673.98 308.55 161.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Mat. Mon. 
π 130.37 122.64 211.74 143.12 111.52 32.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 0.29 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Mat. – Short 
π 93.60 90.18 134.88 130.77 97.19 49.26 52.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
% 17.69 17.25 16.54 15.60 14.42 12.86 11.20 9.58 7.92 6.76 5.60Mat. – Long 
π 394.81 350.35 311.25 277.49 249.14 229.36 214.87 204.84 202.87 195.06 194.08
% 51.74 27.92 15.83 9.62 6.45 4.73 3.71 3.00 2.50 2.18 1.94Overall  
π 165.23 164.55 202.34 262.14 333.51 406.51 476.40 551.99 626.72 684.65 740.33
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Table VI 
Arbitrage opportunities with bid/ask Spreads. Sample composition. 
The table reports the distribution of arbitrage opportunities across moneyness and maturity. Each cell Number of 
arbitrage opportunities for each condition as distributed over maturity and moneyness classes (such classes are defined 
as in Table I). The b/a spread is fixed at 0 and 5%. 
   Very Short Short Medium Long Total 
   α=0 α=5 α=0 α=5 α=0 α=5 α=0 α=5 α=0 α=5
Butterfly  13.47 10.92 7.69 2.30 8.96 1.80 10.02 0.57 8.96 2.85
Short 31.84 10.00 24.86 3.45 18.60 4.00 8.13 0.00 21.87 4.16Box spread Long 30.41 7.45 22.84 2.20 14.18 1.50 9.64 0.19 19.04 2.31
Short 0.82 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00Mat Spread Long 43.78 20.31 24.83 6.64 1.06 0.12 0.00 0.00 14.84 4.76D
O
TM
 
General  52.76 32.65 36.74 8.20 30.93 7.81 19.47 1.70 34.83 10.13
Butterfly  5.03 3.39 3.69 0.16 13.99 1.05 14.83 0.30 8.76 0.85
Short 38.24 8.06 31.44 3.90 22.98 1.86 16.18 0.35 27.56 3.25Box spread Long 37.94 8.32 30.02 2.37 20.90 1.39 14.35 0.65 25.97 2.48
Short 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00Mat Spread Long 49.13 48.31 32.68 31.40 0.99 0.86 0.00 0.00 19.47 18.79
O
TM
 
Overall  52.36 20.33 43.73 6.89 42.66 4.73 34.14 1.30 43.36 7.00
Butterfly  2.94 0.63 8.70 0.38 22.78 1.63 25.77 1.97 14.80 1.02
Short 30.69 7.87 33.66 4.78 22.02 1.85 16.72 1.63 27.45 3.77Box spread Long 30.03 6.82 31.64 2.34 20.85 1.58 18.13 0.52 26.22 2.41
Short 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00Mat Spread Long 44.20 44.17 36.62 36.49 1.15 1.05 0.00 0.00 21.05 20.95
A
TM
 
Overall  53.60 15.53 54.46 8.53 54.96 5.98 53.87 4.19 54.49 8.00
Butterfly  27.33 3.56 21.58 2.26 23.23 2.26 21.55 1.13 22.83 2.33
Short 14.37 4.73 18.99 3.71 12.87 1.78 10.59 1.51 15.69 3.01Box spread Long 10.57 1.35 18.51 1.58 11.37 0.92 11.91 1.42 14.61 1.32
Short 0.37 0.06 0.37 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.05Mat Spread Long 27.21 23.89 23.84 19.78 0.83 0.35 0.00 0.00 14.57 12.14
IT
M
 
Overall  78.99 12.84 65.02 8.88 55.60 6.50 45.84 3.50 62.01 8.13
Butterfly  24.10 1.49 22.91 1.63 17.31 2.94 10.00 0.57 20.26 2.04
Short 5.96 1.12 8.99 1.78 7.83 1.90 4.86 0.57 7.94 1.67Box spread Long 6.21 0.50 8.81 0.91 7.70 1.08 1.43 0.00 7.65 0.87
Short 8.07 0.25 2.57 0.43 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.30 0.22Mat Spread Long 14.16 4.84 14.24 5.07 0.74 0.09 0.00 0.00 8.42 2.91
D
IT
M
 
Overall  79.75 5.09 71.91 6.52 63.39 8.83 37.14 1.43 67.81 6.91
Butterfly  11.13 3.04 11.07 1.03 18.20 1.73 19.95 1.19 14.48 1.53
Short 27.17 6.94 27.19 3.96 19.11 2.17 14.18 1.07 23.08 3.39Box spread 
Long 25.99 5.62 25.76 2.06 17.26 1.38 14.45 0.65 21.66 2.09
Short 0.96 0.03 0.38 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.03Mat Spread 
Long 39.29 34.97 29.94 25.85 1.01 0.67 0.00 0.00 17.69 15.32
To
ta
l 
Overall  60.41 17.06 53.31 8.00 49.15 6.28 43.45 2.94 51.74 7.97
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Table VII 
Informational Content of MIBO30 Implied Volatility – Forecasting and Encompassing 
Regression Tests for Classes of Moneyness and Time-to-Maturity (GMM). 
Original Data (Purged of Violations of the Lower Bound Condition) 
The table reports the GMM estimates of the coefficients α. β. and γ in the regression tests of forecast rationality: 
σ*(t. τ) = α + β IV(zt. t. τ) + u(zt. t. τ)  and 
σ*(t. τ) = α + β IV(zt. t. τ) + γ xt + u(zt. t. τ) 
where σ*(t. τ) is the annualized standard deviation of MIB30 (infra-daily) log- returns. and u(zt. t. τ) is a white-
noise residual. xt corresponds to either the rolling window standard deviation of (infra-daily) MIB30 returns over 
the 30 days preceding t. or the lagged value if IV. * indicates that a coefficient is significant at 5%. while ** means 
significant at 1%. In the case of encompassing regressions we only report the estimate of γ for the two definitions 
of xt. When the IVs represent rational forecasts of future volatility. α = 0 and β = 1. In encompassing regressions. 
α = γ= 0 and β = 1. 
 
 
 Very short Short Medium Long All maturities 
GMMαˆ 0.1192 
GMMβˆ  0.2562** 
R2 0.1003 
Numb. Obs. (367) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.1868 
-0.0143 
0.0060 
(688) 
-1.0621** 
0.1050 
 0.2561* 
0.1320 
(2.567) 
-0.1839* 
0.1246 
0.1231 
0.0781 
(2.685) 
 0.2043** -1.1331** 
0.1395 
0.0907 
0.0773 
(6.307) 
0.0653 
DOTM 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. -0.0101  0.1755* 0.0891 0.1663** 0.0383 
GMMαˆ 0.1224 
GMMβˆ  0.2206* 
R2 0.0561 
Numb. Obs. (1.335) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.1571 
0.0183 
0.0038 
(2.006) 
-0.3080** 
0.1322 
0.1217 
0.0711 
(6.362) 
-0.1861 
  0.1693 
-0.0414 
 0.0064 
(5.322) 
-0.2519* -1.0194** 
0.1467 
0.0590 
0.0137 
(15.025) 
-0.1985 
OTM 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. 0.0132  0.0594* -0.0242 0.1354 0.0410 
GMMαˆ 0.0971 
GMMβˆ  0.2992** 
R2 0.0660 
Numb. Obs. (2.590) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.1005 
 0.2230* 
0.1516 
(5.210) 
-0.1307 
0.1292 
0.1357 
0.0467 
(10.399) 
-0.1433 
  0.2014 
-0.1638 
  0.0848 
(10.419) 
 -0.2845*  -1.1863** 
0.1408 
0.0846 
0.0104 
(28.618) 
-0.2796* 
ATM 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. 0.1362 0.0894 -0.1072 0.1953 0.0529 
GMMαˆ 0.1116 
GMMβˆ 0.2312** 
R2 0.0470 
Numb. Obs. (1.447) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.1332 
0.0698 
0.0589 
(2.183) 
 0.2034** 
0.1541 
0.0317 
0.0143 
(5.801) 
0.0199 
 0.2048 
-0.1643* 
0.1349 
(5.741) 
-0.3555** -1.2281** 
 0.1740 
-0.0505 
 0.0066 
(15.172) 
-0.1569 
ITM 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. 0.0495 0.0140 -0.1097 0.1605* -0.0167 
GMMαˆ 0.1336 
GMMβˆ 0.0544* 
R2 0.0200 
Numb. Obs. (558) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.1457 
0.0155 
0.0088 
(1.041) 
 0.3547** 
0.1722 
0.0165 
0.0068 
(3.119) 
-0.3296* 
 0.1890 
-0.0742 
0.0977 
(3.689) 
-0.2239** -1.3585** 
 0.1796 
-0.0340 
0.0138 
(8.407) 
-0.1870* 
DITM 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. 0.0119 0.0037 -0.0379 0.0282 -0.0154 
GMMαˆ 0.1438 
GMMβˆ 0.1000 
R2 0.0136 
Numb. Obs. (6.297) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
 0.1423 
 0.0435 
 0.0264 
(11.128) 
-0.0481 
 0.1062 
 0.2394 
 0.0771 
(28.248) 
-0.1382 
 0.1882 
-0.1113 
 0.0298 
(27.856) 
-0.2874 -1.1610** 
0.1508 
0.0351 
0.0055 
(73.529) 
-0.1747 
All levels 
of 
moneyness 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1.  0.0348 0.1617 -0.0737 -0.0720 0.0236 
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Table VIII 
Informational Content of MIBO30 Implied Volatility – Forecasting and Encompassing 
Regression Tests for Classes of Moneyness and Time-to-Maturity (GMM). 
Arbitrage-Free Data. 
The table reports the GMM estimates of the coefficients α. β. and γ in the regression tests of forecast rationality: 
σ*(t. τ) = α + β IV(zt. t. τ) + u(zt. t. τ)  and 
σ*(t. τ) = α + β IV(zt. t. τ) + γ xt + u(zt. t. τ) 
where σ*(t. τ) is the annualized standard deviation of MIB30 (infra-daily) log- returns. and u(zt. t. τ) is a white-
noise residual. xt corresponds to either the rolling window standard deviation of (infra-daily) MIB30 returns over 
the 30 days preceding t. or the lagged value if IV. * indicates that a coefficient is significant at 5%. while ** means 
significant at 1%. In the case of encompassing regressions we only report the estimate of γ for the two definitions 
of xt. When the IVs represent rational forecasts of future volatility. α = 0 and β = 1. In encompassing regressions. 
α = γ= 0 and β = 1. ♣ indicates that a slope coefficient is not significantly different from 1 at 5%. 
 
 
 Very short Short Medium Long All maturities 
GMMαˆ 0.1221 
GMMβˆ  0.2485** 
R2 0.0860 
Numb. Obs. (363) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.1737 
0.0016 
0.0001 
(463) 
-0.8217** 
0.0709 
 0.4079** 
0.2967 
(2.507) 
 0.2860** 
0.1182 
0.1522 
0.0948 
(2.550) 
 0.2051** -1.1238** 
0.1326 
0.1249 
0.1067 
(5.883) 
 0.3685** 
DOTM 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. 0.0008  0.2510* 0.1052 0.1531 0.0632 
GMMαˆ  0.1856 
GMMβˆ -0.0269 
R2 0.0003 
Numb. Obs. (1.274) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.1458 
0.0474 
0.0175 
(1.580) 
-0.0015 
0.0461 
0.5168 
0.3774 
(6.182) 
 0.2344* 
  0.1761 
-0.0515 
 0.0054 
(5.012) 
 -0.2107*   -1.2297** 
0.1275 
0.1580 
0.0600 
(14.048) 
0.1569 
OTM 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. 0.0359  0.2870* -0.0344 -0.0204 0.1071 
GMMαˆ 0.3269 
GMMβˆ  -0.6441** 
R2 0.0938 
Numb. Obs. (2.572) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.0799 
 0.3076** 
0.2721 
(3.642) 
 0.1620* 
0.0346 
0.5587* 
0.2971 
(10.114) 
0.1912 
  0.1962 
-0.1026 
  0.0108 
 (9.760) 
-0.1293  -1.6943** 
0.1093 
0.2567 
0.0686 
(26.088) 
0.0370 
ATM 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. 0.1784 0.2899 -0.0635 -0.4245* 0.1552 
GMMαˆ 0.3565 
GMMβˆ -0.7103** 
R2 0.1555 
Numb. Obs. (1.385) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.1288 
0.0922 
0.0778 
(1.746) 
 0.3840** 
0.0261 
  0.5966*.♣ 
0.2745 
(5.505) 
0.3213* 
 0.2098 
-0.1058 
0.0096 
(5.526) 
0.0292 -1.8175** 
0.1452 
0.1342 
0.0232 
(14.162) 
0.2741 
ITM 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. 0.0646 0.3386 -0.0701 -0.4664** 0.1247 
GMMαˆ 0.3605 
GMMβˆ -0.6795** 
R2 0.3107 
Numb. Obs. (546) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.1510 
0.0163 
0.0090 
(892) 
 0.4820** 
0.0639 
0.4859 
0.2762 
(2.872) 
 0.3881* 
0.1648 
0.1580 
0.0225 
(3.471) 
0.1979 -3.1775** 
0.2002 
-0.0042 
0.0001 
(7.781) 
0.4971 
DITM 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. 0.0124 0.3156 0.1003 -0.3712** 0.0485 
GMMαˆ 0.2542 
GMMβˆ -0.3101 
R2 0.0404 
Numb. Obs. (6.140) 
GMMγˆ xt = RW vol. 
0.1399 
0.0598 
0.0476 
(8.323) 
0.0459 
0.0388 
0.5497 
0.3431 
(27.180) 
0.2146 
0.1413 
0.1539 
0.0227 
(26.319) 
-0.1039 -1.5882** 
0.1374 
0.1455 
0.0482 
(67.962) 
0.2308 
All levels 
of 
moneyness 
GMMγˆ xt = IVt-1. 0.0480 0.3275 0.0975 -0.2160 0.1057 
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Table IX 
Informational Content of MIBO30 Implied Volatility – Regression Tests for Classes of 
Moneyness and Time-to-Maturity (FGLS) 
The table reports the FGLS estimates of the coefficients α and β in the regression tests of forecast rationality: 
σ*(t. τ) = α + β IV(zt. t. τ) + u(zt. t. τ). 
where σ*(t. τ) is the annualized standard deviation of MIB30 (infra-daily) log- returns. and u(zt. t. τ) is a white-
noise residual. * indicates that a coefficient is significant at 5%. while ** means significant at 1%.The two panels 
report results for the two balanced panels built by reduction of the original data sets (lower-bound violations and 
arbitrage violations-free) in Section 5. When the IVs represent rational forecasts of future volatility. α = 0 and β = 
1. 
 
Panel A  panel derived from lower bound violation-free data (21.589 obs.) 
 Very short Short Medium Long 
FGLSαˆ
FGLSβˆ
R2DOTM 
Numb. Obs. 
  0.2000** 
-0.0060 
0.0137 
(210) 
 0.1610** 
0.0024 
0.0007 
(976) 
 0.1538** 
-0.0040** 
0.0245 
(720) 
  0.1720** 
-0.0002 
0.0000 
(147) 
FGLSαˆ
FGLSβˆ
R2
OTM 
Numb. Obs. 
0.3800* 
-0.0039* 
0.0095 
(594) 
  0.1556** 
-0.0000 
0.0000 
(1.768) 
  0.2680* 
-0.0005 
0.0005 
(1.747) 
  0.7700** 
0.0008 
0.0056 
(445) 
FGLSαˆ
FGLSβˆ
R2ATM 
Numb. Obs. 
  0.1607** 
-0.0020 
0.0001 
(794) 
 0.1667** 
0.0100** 
0.0059 
(1.999) 
  0.1900** 
-0.0012* 
0.0022 
(2.052) 
 0.2000** 
-0.0026* 
0.0133 
(491) 
FGLSαˆ
FGLSβˆ
R2ITM 
Numb. Obs. 
  0.1593** 
-0.0043 
0.0045 
(660) 
 0.2070** 
-0.0026* 
0.0030 
(1.682) 
  0.1860** 
0.0002 
0.0002 
(1.742) 
  0.1840** 
0.0015 
0.0001 
(472) 
FGLSαˆ
FGLSβˆ
R2DITM 
Numb. Obs. 
  0.1778** 
-0.0002 
0.0001 
(458) 
 0.2190** 
-0.0055** 
0.0139 
(865) 
 0.9540** 
-0.0019** 
0.0120 
(1.109) 
  0.1930** 
-0.0035 
0.0044 
(186) 
Panel B  panel derived from arbitrage-free data (21.165obs.) 
 Very short Short Medium Long 
FGLSαˆ
FGLSβˆ
R2DOTM 
Numb. Obs. 
  0.1969** 
-0.0086* 
0.0297 
(201)♣ 
 0.1610** 
0.0076* 
0.0041 
(976) 
  0.1500** 
-0.0003 
0.0001 
(720) 
  0.1552** 
-0.0005 
0.0001 
(147) 
FGLSαˆ
FGLSβˆ
R2
OTM 
Numb. Obs. 
0.2330 
-0.0010 
0.0005 
(594) 
  0.1584** 
0.0114* 
0.0056 
(1.722) 
  0.2777* 
-0.0000 
0.0000 
(1.726) 
  0.7720** 
0.0007 
0.0043 
(445) 
FGLSαˆ
FGLSβˆ
R2
ATM 
Numb. Obs. 
  0.1600** 
-0.0034** 
0.0006 
(792) 
 0.1679** 
-0.0004 
0.0001 
(1.950) 
  0.3360** 
-0.0012 
0.0022 
(2.017) 
  0.1828** 
-0.0018 
0.0007 
(573) 
FGLSαˆ
FGLSβˆ
R2ITM 
Numb. Obs. 
 0.1647** 
-0.0078** 
0.0181 
(580) 
 0.1711** 
0.0029 
0.0008 
(1.628) 
  0.1917** 
0.0008 
0.0013 
(1.722) 
  0.1843** 
0.0015 
0.0002 
(467) 
FGLSαˆ
FGLSβˆ
R2DITM 
Numb. Obs. 
 0.2138** 
-0.0027* 
0.0148 
(405) 
 0.1820** 
-0.0073 
0.0092 
(824) 
  0.3710** 
0.0006 
0.0021 
(1.071) 
 0.1920** 
-0.0037 
0.0040 
(186) 
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Figure 1 
Empirical Distribution of Arbitrage Profits on the MIBO30 Market 
The graph reports the empirical density and distribution function of the maximum arbitrage profits across the 
different conditions. Arbitrage profits are expressed in MIB30 index points. 
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Figure 2 
Percentage Incidence of Arbitrage Violations As a Function of Alternative Levels  
of the Bid/Ask Spread. 
The graphs plot the changes in the percentage of the data displaying violations of the basic no-arbitrage 
conditions derived in Section 4 as a function of the (half-) size of the bid/ask spreads α and β characterizing the 
MIBO30 (options) and the MIB30 index (the underlying) markets. respectively. These scenario simulations 
impose the restriction α = β. 
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Figure 3 
Average Arbitrage Profit Rates as a Function of Alternative Levels  
of the Bid/Ask Spread. 
The graph plots the changes in the average profit rates obtained by exploiting the presence of violations of the 
basic no-arbitrage conditions derived in Section 4 as a function of the (half-) size of the bid/ask spreads α and β 
characterizing the MIBO30 (options) and the MIB30 index (the underlying) markets. respectively. These scenario 
simulations impose the restriction α = β. 
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Figure 4 
Percentage Incidence of Arbitrage Violations As a Function of Alternative Levels  
of the Bid/Ask Spread and Moneyness Classes 
The graphs plot the ratio of arbi9trage opportunities arising from any of the conditions listed in Section3 
(“Overall”) or just the Maturity spread. long side as a function of the (half-) size of the bid/ask spread. α. for 
different moneyness classes; the line labeled “Total” refers to the whole sample. For the Overall condition the 
lines of remaining moneyness classes remain within those relative to DOTM and DITM. In particular ATM 
almost coincides with the line corresponding to the whole sample (represented in Figure 2). 
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Figure 5 
Daily Incidence of the Percentage Incidence of Arbitrage Violations on  
the MIBO30 Market and the value of the MIB30 index 
The graph plots the percentage of arbitrage violations of any type detected and the value of the MIB30 index for 
each day in the between April 1999 and January. The upper line describes the value reached by the MIB30 index 
as a ratio of the maximum over the sample period. The intermediate line corresponds to daily ratio of arbitrage 
violations when α=0. i.e. in the case of no frictions; the lower line corresponds to the case α=5%. The straight 
horizontal lines represent the corresponding mean sample values. 
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